000			01844 a2200229 4500
008			140323b2002 xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780521796798
082			_a153.4 _bH3
245			_aHeuristics and biases: the psychology of intuitive judgment
260			_c2002 _bCambridge University Press _aCambridge
300			_axiii, 857 p.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 763-853) and index.
520			_aIs our case strong enough to go to trial? Will interest rates go up? Can I trust this person? Such questions - and the judgments required to answer them - are woven into the fabric of everyday experience. This 2002 book examines how people make such judgments. The study of human judgment was transformed in the 1970s, when Kahneman and Tversky introduced their 'heuristics and biases' approach and challenged the dominance of strictly rational models. Their work highlighted the reflexive mental operations used to make complex problems manageable and illuminated how the same processes can lead to both accurate and dangerously flawed judgments. The heuristics and biases framework generated a torrent of influential research in psychology - research that reverberated widely and affected scholarship in economics, law, medicine, management, and political science. This book compiles the most influential research in the heuristics and biases tradition since the initial collection of 1982 (by Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky). (http://www.cambridge.org/gb/knowledge/isbn/item1168232/?site_locale=en_GB)
650			_aGeneral _9211302
650			_aJudgment _9784
650			_aReasoning (Psychology) _9211303
650			_aCritical thinking _956372
700			_aGilovich, Thomas _eEditor _9211304
700			_aGriffin, Dale W. _eEditor _9211305
700			_aKahneman, Daniel _eEditor _9211306
942			_cBK
999			_c166454 _d166454