The Quality of foreign aid: country selectivity or donors incentives?

By: Material type: TextTextSeries: Policy Research Working paper, No. 3325Publication details: Washington, D. C. World Bank 2004Description: 33 pSubject(s): DDC classification:
  • 338.91
Summary: The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor quality projects either because they are unable to assess the worth of the projects or they will benefit personally.
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Books Vikram Sarabhai Library Rack 23-B / Slot 1002 (0 Floor, East Wing) General Stacks 338.91 W2Q8 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 158166

The author investigates the determinants of foreign aid quality. He shows that design effects are a crucial component of quality. He thus establishes that donors have an impact on the quality of the foreign assistance they provide. The author also shows both theoretically and empirically that the quality of aid is endogenous to the relationship between the donor agency and the recipient government. Highly capable and accountable governments accept only well-designed projects, whereas governments with low accountability may accept poor quality projects either because they are unable to assess the worth of the projects or they will benefit personally.

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