Economics of consanguineous marriages

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Policy Research Working Paper, no. 4085Publication details: Washington, D. C. World Bank 2006Description: 34 pSubject(s): DDC classification:
  • 301.42 D6E2
Summary: The institution of consanguineous marriage - a marriage contracted between close biological relatives - has been a basic building block of many societies in different parts of the world. This paper argues that the practice of consanguinity is closely related to the practice of dowry, and that both arise in response to an agency problem between the families of a bride and a groom. When marriage contracts are incomplete, dowries transfer control rights to the party with the highest incentives to invest in a marriage. When these transactions are costly however, consanguinity can be a more appropriate response since it directly reduces the agency cost. The paper's model predicts that dowry transfers are less likely to be observed in consanguineous unions. It also emphasizes the effect of credit constraints on the relative prevalence of dowry payment and consanguinity. An empirical analysis using data from Bangladesh delivers robust results consistent with the predictions of the model. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950455
List(s) this item appears in: World Bank Working Paper Series
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Holdings
Item type Current library Item location Shelving location Call number Status Date due Barcode
Books Vikram Sarabhai Library Rack 9-A / Slot 294 (0 Floor, West Wing) General Stacks 301.42 D6E2 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 162890

The institution of consanguineous marriage - a marriage contracted between close biological relatives - has been a basic building block of many societies in different parts of the world. This paper argues that the practice of consanguinity is closely related to the practice of dowry, and that both arise in response to an agency problem between the families of a bride and a groom. When marriage contracts are incomplete, dowries transfer control rights to the party with the highest incentives to invest in a marriage. When these transactions are costly however, consanguinity can be a more appropriate response since it directly reduces the agency cost. The paper's model predicts that dowry transfers are less likely to be observed in consanguineous unions. It also emphasizes the effect of credit constraints on the relative prevalence of dowry payment and consanguinity. An empirical analysis using data from Bangladesh delivers robust results consistent with the predictions of the model.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950455

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.