What happens when a country does not adjust to terms of trade shocks?: the case of oil-rich Gabon
Material type:
- 338.9 Z2W4
Item type | Current library | Item location | Shelving location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Books | Vikram Sarabhai Library | Rack 23-B / Slot 995 (0 Floor, East Wing) | General Stacks | 338.9 Z2W4 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 161933 |
Gabon is currently one of the richest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, having a GDP per
capita of close to $4,000, and is characterized by a stable political climate and very rich forestry
and mineral resources, as well as a small population. Oil is the key economic sector, accounting
for half of GDP and more than two-thirds of revenue. Discovered in the 1970s, oil windfalls have
delivered spectacular wealth and financed public expenditure over two decades. However, the oil
boom has led to the Dutch disease and the shrinkage of the industrial and agricultural sectors of
the economy due to the appreciation of the exchange rate and the movement of capital to the oil
sector. However, with output projections suggesting that oil will be depleted within the next 10 to
15 years, there are growing pressures on the policymakers to take actions to diversify production.
While Gabon’s membership in the Central African economic and monetary union means that it
benefits from the macroeconomic stability from a common external trade and fixed exchange rate
regime pegged to the euro, it relinquishes independence in the policy response to shocks.
An analysis using a quantitative methodology to decompose responses to shocks shows
that Gabon’s adjustment to adverse movements in the terms and trade from 1980 to 2000 was
considerably weak in terms of three performance indicators: import intensity, economic
compression, and nonoil export promotion. While the economy’s growth rate was respectable,
Gabonese policymakers postponed adjustment by resorting to considerable borrowing during this
period. While there was some decrease in import intensity from 1987 to 1990 and 1996 to 2000 as
well as slight nonoil export diversification from 1996 to 2000, the government borrowed from
commercial banks and donors, causing its external debt/GDP ratio to increase spectacularly from
30 percent of GDP in 1970-76 to 80 percent in 1999. In order to pay the debt service, it currently
has to maintain large primary surpluses. Only since 1996 has there been significant fiscal
retrenchment and a freezing of government wages.
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/666031468771018052/101501322_20041117175002/additional/wps3403.pdf
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