Unemployment, skills, and incentives: an overview of the safety net system in the Slovak Republic

Do unemployment insurance and social assistance payments have disincentive effects on job seeking behavior and the duration of unemployment in the Slovak Republic? The evidence suggests they do. Sánchez-Páramo studies the potential disincentive effects of unemployment insurance and social assistance payments on the duration of unemployment in the Slovak Republic. For this purpose, she uses new, very detailed data on receipt of benefits from the Unemployment Registry (1990–2000) and the Labor Force Survey (1996, 1999, and 2000). She employs a flexible methodology that makes it possible to identify behavioral changes that may occur as the quantity and duration of the benefits change over time, as well as behavioral differences between recipients and nonrecipients. This approach, she argues, constitutes a more accurate test for the presence of incentive and disincentive effects than those presented before in the literature. She expands the scope of her analysis to study the effect of receiving benefits on several outcomes in addition to exit from unemployment (for example, job seeking behavior and duration of unemployment). She finds important behavioral differences between those who receive benefits and those who do not. Recipients tend to spend more time unemployed, but they also look for employment more actively than their counterparts, have more demanding preferences with respect to their future jobs, and find jobs in the private sector more often. In addition, these jobs turn out to be better matches than those obtained by nonrecipients (with the quality of the match measured by its duration). Moreover, the behavior of recipients varies tremendously depending on whether they are actually receiving benefits or not. Once their benefits are exhausted, they exit the Unemployment Registry at a higher rate, search more actively, and move into private sector jobs more.