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The principal agent model: the economic theory of incentives

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, 162Publication details: Cheltenham Edward Elgar Publishing 2003Description: xvi, 679 pISBN:
  • 1843762404
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 658.314
Summary: Incentive theory is the most important development in economics in the last forty years. The principal-agent model is the core of this theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential literature concerning the principal-agent model when no restrictions on the design of the principal's contract exist in terms of complexity, enforcement or rationality. Part I covers the foundations of the principal-agent theory from the first historical formulation of the problem to the first attempts to formalize it. Part II deals with the case of moral hazard and adverse selection is the topic of Part III. Part IV presents contributions on current research issues such as the impact of communication constraints, endogenous information structures and multidimensional incentive problems. The Principal-Agent Model will be an indispensable reference source for all students, researchers and professionals specialising in this subject.
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Item type Current library Item location Shelving location Call number Status Date due Barcode
Books Vikram Sarabhai Library Rack 36-B / Slot 1978 (2nd Floor, East Wing) General Stacks 658.314 P71 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 158977

Incentive theory is the most important development in economics in the last forty years. The principal-agent model is the core of this theory. This authoritative collection brings together the essential literature concerning the principal-agent model when no restrictions on the design of the principal's contract exist in terms of complexity, enforcement or rationality. Part I covers the foundations of the principal-agent theory from the first historical formulation of the problem to the first attempts to formalize it. Part II deals with the case of moral hazard and adverse selection is the topic of Part III. Part IV presents contributions on current research issues such as the impact of communication constraints, endogenous information structures and multidimensional incentive problems. The Principal-Agent Model will be an indispensable reference source for all students, researchers and professionals specialising in this subject.

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