The moral economy: why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens
Series: Castle Lectures in Ethics, Politics, and EconomicsPublication details: Yale University Press 2016 LondonDescription: xvi, 272 pISBN:- 9780300163803
- 330 B6M6
Item type | Current library | Item location | Collection | Shelving location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Books | Vikram Sarabhai Library | Rack 15-A / Slot 527 (0 Floor, West Wing) | Non-fiction | General Stacks | 330 B6M6 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 192747 |
Table of Contents:
1.The problem with homo economics
2.A constitution for knaves
3.Moral sentiments and material interests
4.Incentives as information
5.A liberal civic culture
6.The legislator's dilemma
7.A mandate for Aristotle's legislator.
Why do policies and business practices that ignore the moral and generous side of human nature often fail?
Should the idea of economic man—the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus—determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding “no.” Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may “crowd out” ethical and generous motives and thus backfire.
But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.
(http://yalebooks.com/book/9780300163803/moral-economy)
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