Theory of social choice on networks: preference, aggregation, and coordination

Table of content

1.Preference
1.1.Categorical Preferences
1.2.Reactive vis-a-vis Responsive Models
1.3.Influence Networks
1.3.1.Conditional Preferences
1.3.2.Social Models
1.4.Related Research
1.5.Summary
2.Aggregation
2.1.Classical Aggregation
2.2.Coordinated Aggregation
2.3.Social Coherence
2.3.1.Democratic Social Choice
2.3.2.An Order Isomorphism
2.3.3.Operational Democracy
2.4.Epistemology vis-a-vis Praxeology
2.5.Coherent Aggregation
2.5.1.Bayesian Networks
2.5.2.The Aggregation Theorem
2.6.Solution Concepts
2.7.Reframing
2.8.Summary
3.Deliberation
3.1.Dynamic Influence Models
3.2.Closed-Loop Collaboration
3.3.Non-Simple Cycles
3.3.1.Graphs with Sub-Cycles
3.3.2.Embedded Cycles
3.4.Summary
4.Coordination
4.1.Coordination Concepts
4.2.A Mathematical Characterization of Coordination
4.2.1.Entropy
4.2.2.Mutual Information
4.3.Coordinatability for Networks
Contents note continued: 4.4.Summary
5.Randomization
5.1.Social Choice with Stochastic Agents
5.2.Social Choice with Randomized Preferences
5.2.1.Expected Utility
5.2.2.Expected Utility on Networks
5.3.Summary
6.Satisficing
6.1.Solution Concepts
6.2.A Change in Perspective
6.2.1.Error Avoidance
6.2.2.Failure Avoidance
6.3.The Neo-Satisficing Model
6.3.1.Single-Agent Satisficing
6.3.2.Multiple Selves
6.3.3.Satisficing Social Choice
6.4.Satisficing Coordinatability
6.5.Summary

Classical social choice theory relies heavily on the assumption that all individuals have fixed preference orderings. This highly original book presents a new theory of social preferences that explicitly accounts for important social phenomena such as coordination, compromise, negotiation and altruism. Drawing on cybernetics and network theory, it extends classical social choice theory by constructing a framework that allows for dynamic preferences that are modulated by the situation-dependent social influence that they exert on each other. In this way the book shows how members of a social network may modulate their preferences to account for social context. This important expansion of social choice theory will be of interest to readers in a wide variety of disciplines, including economists and political scientists concerned with choice theory as well as computer scientists and engineers working on network theory.

https://www.cambridge.org/in/academic/subjects/economics/microeconomics/theory-social-choice-networks-preference-aggregation-and-coordination?format=PB