Handbook of computational social choice

Table of contents

Foreword
Herve Moulin
1. Introduction to computational social choice
Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jerome Lang and Ariel D. Procaccia

Part I. Voting
2. Introduction to the theory of voting
William S. Zwicker
3. Tournament solutions
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill and Paul Harrenstein
4. Weighted tournament solutions
Felix Fischer, Olivier Hudry and Rolf Niedermeier
5. Dodgson's rule and Young's rule
Ioannis Caragiannis, Edith Hemaspaandra and Lane A. Hemaspaandra
6. Barriers to manipulation in voting
Vincent Conitzer and Toby Walsh
7. Control and bribery in voting
Piotr Faliszewski and Joerg Rothe
8. Rationalizations of voting rules
Edith Elkind and Arkadii Slinko
9. Voting in combinatorial domains
Jerome Lang and Lirong Xia
10. Incomplete information and communication in voting
Craig Boutilier and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Part II. Fair Allocation
11. Introduction to the theory of fair allocation
William Thomson
12. Fair allocation of indivisible goods
Sylvain Bouveret, Yann Chevaleyre and Nicolas Maudet
13. Cake cutting algorithms
Ariel D. Procaccia

Part III. Coalition Formation
14. Matching under preferences
Bettina Klaus, David F. Manlove and Francesca Rossi
15. Hedonic games
Haris Aziz and Rahul Savani
16. Weighted voting games
Georgios Chalkiadakis and Michael Wooldridge

Part IV. Additional Topics
17. Judgment aggregation
Ulle Endriss
18. The axiomatic approach and the internet
Moshe Tennenholtz and Aviv Zohar
19. Knockout tournaments
Virginia Vassilevska-Williams

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

https://www.cambridge.org/in/academic/subjects/computer-science/artificial-intelligence-and-natural-language-processing/handbook-computational-social-choice?format=HB