Philosophy and the precautionary principle: science, evidence, and environmental policy

Table of Contents
Chapter 1 - The precaution controversy
Chapter 2 - Answering the dilemma objection
Chapter 3 - The unity of the precautionary principle
Chapter 4 - The historical argument for precaution
Chapter 5 - Scientific uncertainty
Chapter 6 - Counting the future
Chapter 7 - Precautionary science and the value-free ideal
Chapter 8 - Values, precaution, and uncertainty factors
Chapter 9 - Concluding case studies

Scholars in philosophy, law, economics and other fields have widely debated how science, environmental precaution, and economic interests should be balanced in urgent contemporary problems, such as climate change. One controversial focus of these discussions is the precautionary principle, according to which scientific uncertainty should not be a reason for delay in the face of serious threats to the environment or health. While the precautionary principle has been very influential, no generally accepted definition of it exists and critics charge that it is incoherent or hopelessly vague. This book presents and defends an interpretation of the precautionary principle from the perspective of philosophy of science, looking particularly at how it connects to decisions, scientific procedures, and evidence. Through careful analysis of numerous case studies, it shows how this interpretation leads to important insights on scientific uncertainty, intergenerational justice, and the relationship between values and policy-relevant science.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/philosophy-and-the-precautionary-principle/FB666B607B8A87E3075A235F2F1530AB#fndtn-information