Amazon cover image
Image from Amazon.com

The arrow impossibility theorem

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Kenneth J. Arrow Lecture SeriesPublication details: New York Columbia University Press 2014Description: 152 pISBN:
  • 9780231153287
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 324.65 M2A7
Summary: Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking “impossibility theorem” was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow’s theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem’s value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal—given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions. (https://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-15328-7/the-arrow-impossibility-theorem)
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
Star ratings
    Average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Holdings
Item type Current library Item location Collection Shelving location Call number Status Date due Barcode
Books Vikram Sarabhai Library Rack 14-A / Slot 507 (0 Floor, West Wing) Non-fiction General Stacks 324.65 M2A7 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Available 186023

Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking “impossibility theorem” was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence.

In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow’s theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem’s value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal—given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.
(https://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-231-15328-7/the-arrow-impossibility-theorem)

There are no comments on this title.

to post a comment.