Online and matching-based market design
Material type:
- 9781108831994
- 330.015118 O6
Item type | Current library | Item location | Collection | Shelving location | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Books | Vikram Sarabhai Library | Rack 15-A / Slot 539 (0 Floor, West Wing) | Non-fiction | General Stacks | 330.015118 O6 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 207340 |
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330.0151 S9M2 Mathematics of economics analysis | 330.0151 W3H6 How economics became a mathematical science | 330.0151166 R6W4 Who gets what and why: the hidden world of matchmaking and market design | 330.015118 O6 Online and matching-based market design | 330.0151195 H2 Handbook of econometrics: vol. 7A | 330.0151563 J8C6 The cointegrated VAR model: methodology and applications | 330.01518282 B7H2 Handbook in Monte Carlo simulation: applications in financial engineering, risk management and economics |
The rich, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field of matching-based market design is an active and important one due to its highly successful applications with economic and sociological impact. Its home is economics, but with intimate connections to algorithm design and operations research. With chapters contributed by over fifty top researchers from all three disciplines, this volume is unique in its breadth and depth, while still being a cohesive and unified picture of the field, suitable for the uninitiated as well as the expert. It explains the dominant ideas from computer science and economics underlying the most important results on market design and introduces the main algorithmic questions and combinatorial structures. Methodologies and applications from both the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras are covered in detail. Key chapters discuss the basic notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives, and the way market design seeks solutions guided by normative criteria borrowed from social choice theory.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/online-and-matchingbased-market-design/604CA9FF1396C489D6497CF336368524#fndtn-information
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