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Multiethnic coalitions in Africa: business financing of opposition election campaigns

By: Arriola, Leonardo R.
Series: Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Publisher: Cambridge Cambridge University Press 2013Description: xvii, 304 p.ISBN: 9781107605435.Subject(s): Social science | Opposition (Political science) - Africa, Sub-Saharan | Electoral coalitions - Africa, Sub-Saharan | Campaign funds - Africa, Sub-Saharan | Africa, Sub-Saharan - Ethnic relations - Political aspects | Africa, Sub-Saharan - Politics and government - 1960 | Kenya - Politics and government | Cameroon - Politics and governmentDDC classification: 324.70967 Summary: Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.
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Books Vikram Sarabhai Library
Slot 472 (0 Floor, West Wing) Non-fiction 324.70967 A7M8 (Browse shelf) Available 178628

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals.

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