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Evidence, decision and causality

By: Publication details: Cambridge University Press 2017 United KingdomDescription: ix, 250 pISBN:
  • 9781316641545
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 122 A4E9
Summary: Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the symptomatic value of options over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings, including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to make a practical difference. The arguments make novel use of machinery from other areas of philosophical inquiry, including first-person epistemology and the free will debate. The book also illustrates the applicability of decision theory itself to questions about the direction of time and the special epistemic status of agents. The first book-length treatment of the dispute about the nature of rational choice Makes original contributions to a long-standing philosophical problem in the foundations of decision theory Includes new or little-discussed examples drawing on a wide range of disciplines, such as psychology, economic theory and philosophy of physics http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-science/evidence-decision-and-causality?format=PB#S3ySQYTkEKqkfF5M.97
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Item type Current library Item location Collection Shelving location Call number Status Date due Barcode
Books Vikram Sarabhai Library Rack 4-B / Slot 128 (0 Floor, West Wing) Non-fiction General Stacks 122 A4E9 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Not for Issue 196867

Most philosophers agree that causal knowledge is essential to decision-making: agents should choose from the available options those that probably cause the outcomes that they want. This book argues against this theory and in favour of evidential or Bayesian decision theory, which emphasises the symptomatic value of options over their causal role. It examines a variety of settings, including economic theory, quantum mechanics and philosophical thought-experiments, where causal knowledge seems to make a practical difference. The arguments make novel use of machinery from other areas of philosophical inquiry, including first-person epistemology and the free will debate. The book also illustrates the applicability of decision theory itself to questions about the direction of time and the special epistemic status of agents.

The first book-length treatment of the dispute about the nature of rational choice
Makes original contributions to a long-standing philosophical problem in the foundations of decision theory
Includes new or little-discussed examples drawing on a wide range of disciplines, such as psychology, economic theory and philosophy of physics


http://www.cambridge.org/gb/academic/subjects/philosophy/philosophy-science/evidence-decision-and-causality?format=PB#S3ySQYTkEKqkfF5M.97


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