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From the knowledge argument to mental substance: resurrecting the mind

By: Robinson, Howard.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: New York Cambridge University Press 2016Description: xiv, 270 p.ISBN: 9781107455481 .Subject(s): Philosophy of mind | Knowledge - Theory | Materialism | PhysicalismDDC classification: 128.2 Summary: This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-the-knowledge-argument-to-mental-substance/321674C1D98D68560EF85DFFA1825085#fndtn-contents
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Slot 132 (0 Floor, West Wing) Non-fiction 128.2 R6F7 (Browse shelf) Available 198587

Table of Contents
Part I - The power of the knowledge argument pp 1-144
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1 - Introducing the knowledge argument

2 - Dennett’s denial of Mary’s ignorance

3 - The abilities hypothesis and other functionalist strategies

4 - Why Frank should not have jilted Mary

5 - The phenomenal concept strategy

6 - Davidson, non-reductive physicalism and naturalism without physicalism

7 - Mysterianism, neutral monism and panpsychism

8 - Conclusion

Part II - Why physicalism entails epiphenomenalism

9 - Reductionism and the status of the special sciences

10 - Vagueness, realism, language and thought

11 - Composite objects, the special sciences, conceptualism and realism

12 - Why there are (probably) no physical individuals

13 - Dennett and the human perspective

Part III - Arguments for mental substance

14 - Some current arguments for substance dualism

15 - An argument for the existence of mental substance

16 - Plotinus,Lockeand Humeon the unity of individual substances

This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defense of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle, and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism, and the mind-body problem.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-the-knowledge-argument-to-mental-substance/321674C1D98D68560EF85DFFA1825085#fndtn-contents

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