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Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism: new essays

Contributor(s): Goldberg, Sanford [Editor].
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookPublisher: New, York Cambridge University Press 2015Description: xi, 263 p. With index.ISBN: 9781107636736 .Subject(s): Reference Philosophy | Externalism Philosophy of mind | Self - knowledgeDDC classification: 121.68 Summary: Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, including 2D semantics, transparency views of self-knowledge, and theories of linguistic understanding, as well as epistemological debates on contextualism, contrastivism, pragmatic encroachment, anti-luminosity arguments and testimony. The scope of the volume will appeal to graduate students and researchers in epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, cognitive science, psychology and linguistics. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/externalism-selfknowledge-and-skepticism/45AA9149E430D2AC4F23975B7205BED0#fndtn-information
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Slot 130 (0 Floor, West Wing) Non-fiction 121.68 E9 (Browse shelf) Available 198581

Table of contents
Part 1 - Foundations of Self-Knowledge
1 - Luminosity and the KK thesis
2 - Some questions about Burge’s “self-verifying judgments”
3 - Self-knowledge: the reality of privileged access
4 - Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradox
Part 2 - Content Transparency
5 - Further thoughts on the transparency of mental content
6 - Counting concepts: response to Paul Boghossian
7 - Internalism, externalism, and accessibilism
8 - The insignificance of transparency
9 - On knowing what thoughts one’s utterances express
10 - Anti-individualism, comprehension, and self-knowledge
Part 3 - Metasemantics and the Nature of Mental Content
11 - Externalism, self-knowledge, and memory
12 - Externalism, metainternalism, and self-knowledge
13 - Externalism, metasemantic contextualism, and self-knowledge

Written by an international team of leading scholars, this collection of thirteen new essays explores the implications of semantic externalism for self-knowledge and skepticism, bringing recent developments in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language, and epistemology to bear on the issue. Structured in three parts, the collection looks at self-knowledge, content transparency, and then meta-semantics and the nature of mental content. The chapters examine a wide range of topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language, including 2D semantics, transparency views of self-knowledge, and theories of linguistic understanding, as well as epistemological debates on contextualism, contrastivism, pragmatic encroachment, anti-luminosity arguments and testimony. The scope of the volume will appeal to graduate students and researchers in epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, cognitive science, psychology and linguistics.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/externalism-selfknowledge-and-skepticism/45AA9149E430D2AC4F23975B7205BED0#fndtn-information

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